Here are a few responses to my recent work:
Fred Adams and Annie Steadman. (2004). Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Analysis, 64, 173-181.
Fred Adams and Annie Steadman. (2004). Intentional Action and Moral Considerations: Still Pragmatic. Analysis, 64, 268-276.
Mark Alicke. (2008). Blaming Badly. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 8, 179-186.
Mark Alicke, David Rose and Dori Bloom. (forthcoming). Causation, Norm Violation and Culpable Control. Journal of Philosophy.
Adam Arico. (2010). Folk Psychology, Consciousness, & Context Effects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Edward Cokely and Adam Feltz. (2008). Individual Differences, Judgment Biases, and Theory-of-Mind: Deconstructing the Intentional Action Side Effect Asymmetry. Journal of Research in Personality, 43: 18-24.
Florian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux and Pierre Jacob (forthcoming). On doing things intentionally. Mind and Language.
Fiery Cushman & Alfred Mele (2008). Intentional Action: Two and Half Folk Concepts. In Experimental Philosophy, ed. J. Knobe and S. Nichols. New York: Oxford University Press, NY.
Reply: Alessandro Lanteri. (forthcoming). Three-and-a-half folk concepts of intentional action. Philosophical Studies.
Keith DeRose. Contextualism, Contrastivism and X-Phi Surveys.
Du Xiao-Xiao and Zheng Quan-Quan. (2010). A Brief Review of the Knobe Effect. Advances in Psychological Science. [In Chinese]
Adam Feltz and Maegan Harris. (forthcoming). Perspective in Intentional Action Attribution: Reversing the Side-Effect Effect. Philosophical Psychology.
Adam Feltz. (2008). The Knobe Effect: A Brief Overview. Journal of Mind and Behavior. 28: 265-278.
Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer. (2009). Natural Compatibilism Versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board. Mind & Language24 (1):1-23.
Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely. (2007). An Anomaly in Intentional Action Ascription: More Evidence of Folk Diversity. Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society.
Chad Gonnerman. (2008). Reading Conflicted Minds: An Empirical Follow-up to Knobe and Roedder. Philosophical Psychology, 21: 1-13.
Steve Guglielmo, Andrew Monroe and Bertram Malle. (2009) At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology Inquiry, 52 (5): 449–466.
Guglielmo, S. & Malle, B. F. (forthcoming). Can unintended side effects be intentional? Resolving a controversy over intentionality and morality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.
Guglielmo, S. & Malle, B. F. (2010). Enough Skill to Kill: Intentionality Judgments and the Moral Valence of Action. Cognition, 117, 139-150.
Gilbert Harman. (2006). Intending, Intention, Intent, Intentional Action, and Acting Intentionally: Comments on Knobe and Burra. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6, 269-276.
F.A. Hindriks. (2008). Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry. Philosophical Quarterly 58:233, 630-641.
Reply:Alessandro Lanteri. (2009). Judgements of Intentionality and Moral Worth: Experimental Challenges to Hindriks. Philosophical Quarterly 59:237, 713-720.
Richard Holton. (2010). Norms and the Knobe Effect. Analysis 70, 417-424.
Antti Kauppinen. (2007). The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Explorations, 10: 95-118.
Bertram Malle. The Moral Dimension of Intentionality Judgments. Technical Reports of the Institute of Cognitive and Decision Sciences, No. 04-2, Eugene, Oregon.
Bertram Malle. (2006). Intentionality, Morality, and their Relationship in Human Judgment. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6, 87-113.
Edouard Machery. (2008). Understanding the Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues. Mind and Language 23:2, 165-189.
Reply: Mark Phelan and Hagop Sarkissian (2009) Is the Trade-off Hypothesis Worth Trading For? Mind & Language. 24, 164-180.
Ron Mallon. (2009) Knobe vs. Machery: Testing the Trade-Off Hypothesis. Mind & Language. 23, 246-255.
Hugh McCann. (2005). Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies. Philosophical Psychology, 18, 737-748.
Roblin Meeks. (2004). Unintentionally Biasing the Data: Reply to Knobe. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24, 220-223.
Alfred Mele. Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Alfred Mele. (2003). Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses. Philosophical Psychology, 16, 325-340.
Corinna Michelin, Sandra Pellizzoni, Maria A. Tallandini & Michael Siegal. (2009). Evidence for the side-effect effect in young children: Influence of bilingualism and task presentation format. European Journal of Developmental Psychology. 7:641-652.
Thomas Nadelhoffer. (2004). On Praise, Side Effects, and Folk Ascriptions of Intentionality. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24, 196-213.
Thomas Nadelhoffer. (2004). Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow. Forthcoming in Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24, 259-269.
Thomas Nadelhoffer. (2006). Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: Some Problems for Juror Impartiality. Philosophical Explorations 9:2, 203-219.
Thomas Nadelhoffer. (2006). On Trying to Save the Simple View. Mind & Language 21:5, 565-586.
Jennifer Nado (2008). Effects of Moral Cognition on Judgments of Intentionality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59:4, 709-731.
Bence Nanay. (2010). Morality or Modality? What Does the Attribution of Intentionality Depend On? Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 40:25-39.
Dana Nelkin. Do We Have a Coherent Set of Intuitions About Moral Responsibility? Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31, 243-259.
Shaun Nichols and Joseph Ulatowski. (2007). Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited. Mind and Language, 22: 346-365.
Sandra Pellizzoni, Vittorio Girotto and Luca Surian. (2010). Beliefs and Moral Valence Affect Intentionality Attributions: the Case of Side Effects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Sandra Pellizzoni, Michael Siegal and Luca Surian. (2009). Foreknowledge, caring and the side-effect effect in young children. Developmental Psychology, 45: 289-295.
Mark Phelan and Hagop Sarkissian. (2008). The Folk Strike Back; Or, Why You Didn't Do It Intentionally, Though It Was Bad and You Knew It. Philosophical Studies. 138, 291-298.
Angel Pinillos et al. Philosophy's New Challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action.
Craig Roxborough and Jill Cumby. (2009). Folk Psychological Concepts: Causation. Philosophical Psychology 22:2, 205-213.
Robin Scaife and Jonathan Webber. (forthcoming) Intentional Side-Effects of Action. Journal of Moral Philosophy.
Julius Schälike (2008). Alltagspsychologie, Absichtlichkeit und Werturteil: Zu einigen Befunden der experimentellen Philosophie. Facta Philosophica. 10.
Steven A. Sloman, Philip M. Fernbach, & Scott Ewing. (in press). A Causal Model of Intentionality Judgment. Mind and Language.
Lawrence Solan. (2006).
Where Does Blaming Come From? Brooklyn Law Review 71, 939.
(To download the paper, follow the link and then click on one of the images at the bottom of the page.)
Paulo Sousa and Colin Holbrook. (2010). Folk Concepts of Intentional Action in the Contexts of Amoral and Immoral Luck. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Chandra Sripada. (2009). The 'Deep Self' Model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentionality and responsibility. Philosophical Studies.
Chandra Sripada and Sara Konrath. (forthcoming) Telling More than We Can Know about Intentional Action. Mind & Language.
Reply: David Rose, Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma, Edouard Machery. Deep Trouble for the Deep Self. Unpublished manuscript. University of Pittsburgh.
Reply to the reply: Chandra Sekhar Sripada, Richard Gonzalez, Daniel Kessler, Eric Laber, Sara Konrath, Vijay Nair (2011). A Reply to Rose, Livengood, Sytsma, and Machery.
Reply: Florian Cova and Hichem Naar. (forthcoming) Side-Effect Effect Without Side Effects: The Pervasive Impact of Moral Considerations on Judgments of Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology
Chandra Sripada (forthcoming). Mental state attributions and the side-effect effect, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
Annie Steadman and Fred Adams. Folk Concepts, Surveys and Intentional Action. Proceedings of the international conference 'Intentionality, deliberation and autonomy - the action theoretic basis of practical philosophy' Sienna, Italy.
Steven Sverdlik. (2004). Intentionality and Moral Judgments in Commonsense Thought about Action. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology,24, 224-236.
Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery. (2009). How to Study Folk Intuitions about Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 22:1, 21-35.
Justin Sytsma, Jonathan Livengood, and David Rose. (forthcoming). Two Types of Typicality: Rethinking the Role of Statistical Typicality in Ordinary Causal Attributions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.
Jason Turner. (2004). Folk Intuitions, Asymmetry, and Intentional Side Effects. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology,24, 214-219.
Verena Utikal and Urs Fischbacher (2009). Blame the Rich – Praise the Poor. Research Paper Series Thurgau Institute of Economics and Department of Economics at the University of Konstanz. 46.
Kevin Uttich and Tania Lomborozo (2010) Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect Cognition. 116 87–100.
Ryan Wasserman. Intentional Action and the Unintentional Fallacy.
Andy Wible. (2009). Knobe, Side Effects, and the Morally Good Business. Journal of Business Ethics. 85, 173-178.Eric Wiland. (2007). Intentional Action and 'In Order To.' Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. 27, 113-118.
Jen Wright and John Bengson. (2009) Asymmetries in Folk Judgments of Responsibility and Intentional Action. Mind & Language, 24:1, 24-50.
Julie Yoo. (2004). Folk Psychology and Moral Evaluation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology,24, 237-251.
Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Marc Hauser. (2006). Does emotion mediate the effect of an action's moral status on its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6, 291-304.
Also, see the 28 brief commentaries published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (commentaries begin on page 329).