Strawsonian Variations:
Folk Morality and the Search for a Unified Theory

Joshua Knobe
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill

John M. Doris
Washington University in St. Louis

Much of the agenda for contemporary philosophical work on moral responsibility was set by P. F. Strawson’s (1962) ‘Freedom and Resentment.’ In that essay, Strawson suggests that we focus not so much on metaphysical speculation about the nature of freedom and determinism as on understanding the actual practices surrounding the assignment of praise and blame. If progress can be made on empirical questions regarding how this practice works and what role it serves in people’s lives, it is hoped, progress can be made on the apparent philosophical paradoxes surrounding the notion of moral responsibility.

Although many of the philosophers working on moral responsibility today would disagree with the substantive conclusions Strawson reached in that early essay, almost all have been influenced to some degree by his methodological proposals. Thus, a great many participants in the contemporary debate about moral responsibility make some appeal to “ordinary practice,” particularly to the ordinary practices associated with praise and blame. Each side tries to devise cases in which the other side’s theory yields a conclusion that diverges from ordinary practice, and to the extent that a given theory actually is shown to conflict with people’s ordinary judgments, it is widely supposed that there is at least some reason to reject the theory itself.

It seems to us that this philosophical effort to understand the ordinary practice of moral responsibility judgment has in some ways been a great success and in other ways a

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dismal failure. We have been extremely impressed with the ingenuity philosophers have shown in constructing counterexamples to each other’s theories, and we think that a number of participants in the debate have been successful in coming up with cases in which their opponents’ theories yield conclusions that conflict with ordinary practice. But we have been less impressed with attempts to actually develop theories that accord with ordinary judgments. It seems that each side has managed to show that the other falls prey to counterexamples, resulting in a kind of mutual annihilation or, as Fischer (1994: 83-5) calls it, a ‘dialectical stalemate.’

We want to offer a diagnosis for this persistent difficulty. We suggest that the problem can be traced back to a basic assumption that has guided almost all philosophical discussions of moral responsibility. The assumption is that people should apply the same criteria in all of their moral responsibility judgments. In other words, it is supposed to be possible to come up with a single basic set of criteria that can account for all moral responsibility judgments in all cases – judgments about both abstract questions and concrete questions, about morally good behaviors and morally bad behaviors, about close friends and complete strangers. Apparently, it is supposed to be completely obvious, and hence in need of no justification or argument, that we ought to apply the same criteria in all cases rather than applying different criteria in different cases. This assumption is so basic that it has never even been given a name. We will refer to it as the assumption of invariance.

The question now is whether it is possible to reconcile this assumption of invariance with the aim of developing a theory that captures what is most important about our ordinary practice. That is, the question is whether one can develop a theory that does an acceptable job of fitting with the ordinary practice (perhaps revising that practice here and there but nonetheless holding on to its essential character) and yet relies only on invariant principles for responsibility attribution.

In our view – and in the view of increasing numbers of philosophers (Alexander & Weinberg 2006; Knobe & Nichols forthcoming; Nadelhoffer & Nahmias 2007) – the best way to test an assumption about people’s ordinary judgments is to conduct systematic experimental studies. Recent years have seen numerous studies of responsibility attribution along these lines, and the results collectively suggest a
surprising new hypothesis. It seems that people do not make moral responsibility judgments by applying invariant principles. Instead, it appears that people tend to apply quite different criteria in different kinds of cases. Thus, if one wants to understand why people make the judgments they do, it is no use looking for a single basic set of criteria that fits all of people’s ordinary judgments. A more promising approach would be to look at how and why people may adopt different criteria in different cases, depending on the way an issue is framed, whether the agent is a friend or a stranger, and so on.

This discovery in empirical psychology leaves us with a stark choice in moral philosophy. One option would be to hold on to the goal of fitting with people’s ordinary judgments and thereby abandon the assumption of invariance. The other would be to hold on to the assumption of invariance and thereby accept a quite serious divergence with people’s ordinary judgments. But it seems that one cannot have it both ways. As we shall see, a growing body of experimental results points to the view that it is not possible to capture all of people’s ordinary judgments with a theory that applies the very same criteria in every case.

**Invariantist Theories in Philosophy**

We begin by briefly reviewing some of the major invariantist theories of moral responsibility. Our aim here is not to represent individual theories in detail, but simply to introduce some of the themes that we will be discussing in more depth in the sections to come.

Before reviewing the major theories, however, a few words are in order about what we mean by ‘invariantism.’ A theory counts as invariantist if it applies the same basic criteria in all cases where people are making moral responsibility judgments. Thus, an invariantist theory might say:

1. ‘No matter who we are judging, no matter what the circumstances are, always make moral responsibility judgments by checking to see whether the agent meets the following criteria…’

Note that the criteria given by an invariantist theory need not involve strict necessary and sufficient conditions. The criteria could just as easily involve prototypes, exemplars, or
whatever cognitive scientists think up next. What makes a theory invariantist is not the specific character of the criteria themselves but the fact that the theory applies the same criteria in all cases.

It would, however, be a rejection of invariantism to say:

(2) ‘If the agent is a friend, use the following criteria…,

but if the agent is a stranger, use these other, slightly different criteria…’

It is important to emphasize that the rejection of invariantism does not entail the rejection of a search for clear and definite principles. Rule (2) does give us a definite principle; it’s just that this principle does not have the property of being invariantist. Instead of telling us to apply the same criteria in all cases, it tells us how to apply different criteria in different cases.

Now, to really explain what it is for a rule to be invariantist, we would have to say more precisely what it means to ‘apply the same criteria in all cases.’ Needless to say, this would be a daunting task. (For example, there is a rather trivial sense in which the person who follows rule (2) is applying the same criteria in all cases – namely, that in all cases he or she is applying rule (2).) The technical problems here are thorny, and philosophers of science have been wrestling with them for decades. But in this case, as so often, we think it is possible to make important philosophical progress without first stepping into the swamp of technicalities necessary to ‘define one’s terms.’ The best way to make it clear what counts as an invariantist theory is just to take a look at a few of the major theories from the existing philosophical literature. All of these theories truly do proceed by applying the same criteria to all cases. Our approach, then, will be ostensive: we’ll describe a few of the most influential philosophical theories and then ask whether it

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2 Initially, one might think that it is possible to explain what makes a rule like (2) turn out not to be invariantist just by adverting to its logical form. But things are not quite that simple. Thus, suppose we define the predicate franger by saying that a person is ‘franger’ if she is either a friend who meets criterion x or a stranger who meets criterion y. Then someone could say: ‘I apply the same basic criterion to all cases. No matter who a person is, I always determine whether or not she is morally responsible by checking to see whether she is franger.’ In such a case, it seems clear that the person is not really applying the same criterion in each case – he is applying one criterion to friends, another to strangers – but it has proven extraordinarily difficult to say precisely how rules like this one differ from rules that do legitimately apply the same criteria to every case (see, e.g., Goodman 1954).
is really possible to capture ordinary responsibility judgments using the invariantist approach they all share.³

Of the theories we will be discussing, the oldest and most well known is *incompatibilism* (e.g., Kane 1996; Pereboom 2001; van Inwagen 1983). Incompatibilism is the claim that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism. In other words, incompatibilists say that an agent can never be morally responsible for a behavior if that behavior was a deterministic consequence of certain initial conditions and physical laws. For example, incompatibilists endorsing the Principle of Alternate Possibilities insist that the agent is responsible *only if* she could have done otherwise, a condition allegedly incompatible with causal determinism, and these incompatibilists are committed to the view that in *no case* where the agent was unable to do otherwise can the agent be legitimately attributed responsibility. Recent years have seen an increasingly sophisticated debate about whether the incompatibilist thesis is warranted, but we will not be discussing the nuances of that debate here. Instead, we simply want to emphasize that the many incompatibilist theories on current offer are invariantist views. That is, these theories claim that moral responsibility is *always* incompatible with determinism. No incompatibilist we know of suggests that the incompatibilist thesis might only apply to very close friends or that it might only apply to certain particular types of behaviors. Rather, the thesis is that, for all possible behaviors and all possible contexts, moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism.

Those who reject the incompatibilist thesis are known as *compatibilists*. Thus, compatibilists say that it is possible for a person to be morally responsible even in a deterministic universe. But compatibilists are no less invariantist than the incompatibilists they argue against. Compatibilists typically say that determinism is *never* relevant to moral responsibility in any way. They then put forward some other invariant principle that is supposed to serve as a criterion for moral responsibility judgments in all possible contexts. A wide variety of such criteria have been proposed. We will be concerned here with two of the most influential.⁴

³ For more comprehensive reviews, see Eshleman (2004) and Fischer (1999).
⁴ The two approaches need not be incompatible. Doris (2002: Ch. 7) considers a position that appears to combine elements of both views.
First, the *real self view*. The key claim behind this view is that people are only morally responsible for behaviors that stem from a specific part of the self or a specific type of mental state. Hence, it may be suggested that people are only morally responsible for behaviors that stem from the part of their selves with which they are ‘identified’ (Frankfurt: 1988 53-4) or that they are only responsible for behaviors that accord with their values (Watson 1975).

A second major compatibilist position might be called the *normative competence theory*. This theory says that people are only morally responsible for behaviors that were produced by a process that is appropriately sensitive to reasons (Fischer & Ravizza 1998; Wolf 1998). Proponents of this theory have been especially explicit in claiming that a single basic criterion can be applied to all possible behaviors. Indeed, much of the intellectual excitement surrounding the normative competence theory stems from the ingenious ways in which researchers have been able to derive an apparently diverse array of moral responsibility judgments from an underlying principle that is extremely simple and unified. To put it in the present lexicon, such approaches appeal in part because of the success they appear to have in deploying an invarianist standard.

Debate between these rival views often appeals to ‘ordinary practice.’ Each side tries to come up with cases in which people’s judgments conflict with the conclusions that follow from the other side’s theory. So, for example, incompatibilists try to devise cases in which people would ordinarily say that an agent is not morally responsible for her behavior but in which the major compatibilist positions (real self, normative competence, etc.) all yield the conclusion that she actually is responsible (e.g., Pereboom 2001). Conversely, compatibilists try to find cases in which people would ordinarily say that an agent is morally responsible but in which all of the major incompatibilist positions yield the conclusion that she is not (e.g., Frankfurt 1969).

Our claim is that this is a conflict in which *both* sides endure unacceptable casualties. That is, each side can show that the other’s views conflict with seemingly entrenched judgments in certain kinds of cases. The problem, we suggest, is that people simply do not have invariant criteria for making moral responsibility judgments. Thus, whenever a theory offers an invariant criterion, it will be possible to come up with cases in which people’s judgments conflict with conclusions that can be derived from the
theory. If one really wants to develop a theory that accords with the ordinary practice, one needs to abandon the search for invariant criteria and try instead to examine the ways in which people end up using different criteria in different cases.

Here we will be concerned with three kinds of factors that appear to influence the criteria people use – the abstractness or concreteness of the question, the normative status of the behavior itself, and the relationship between the person making the judgment and the agent being judged.

**Abstract vs. Concrete**

It is essential to distinguish between different ways of checking to see whether a given principle is in accord with ordinary people’s judgments. One approach would be to present people with an explicit statement of the principle itself and ask them whether or not they agree with it. Another would be to look at people’s judgments regarding particular cases and see whether these judgments fit the criteria derived from the principle. The usual view seems to be that both of these approaches are relevant when we are evaluating proposed criteria for moral responsibility.

One of the chief lessons of contemporary cognitive science, however, is that these two approaches quite often lead to different conclusions. It can easily happen that the principles people put forward in abstract conversations have almost nothing to do with the criteria they actually use when considering concrete cases. Thus, most linguists agree that people’s grammatical intuitions about concrete cases are based on a complex competence that is almost entirely unrelated to the principles they are able to apply when asked more abstract, theoretical questions (e.g., Chomsky 1986). Similarly, social psychologists have uncovered numerous factors that appear to influence people’s judgments in concrete cases but which people regard as irrelevant when asked in the abstract (e.g., Wicker 1969). There is good reason to expect that judgments about moral responsibility will show a similar pattern. That is, one should expect to find that people’s judgments in concrete cases do not match up perfectly with the principles they endorse in more abstract discussions.
One particularly striking example arises in the debate over whether ordinary
people are compatibilists or incompatibilists. The most common view among
philosophers is that most people have strongly incompatibilist inclinations:

Beginning students typically recoil at the compatibilist
response to the problem of moral responsibility. (Pereboom
2001: xvi)

… we come to the table, nearly all of us, as pretheoretic
incompatibilists. (Ekstrom 2002: 310)

In my experience, most ordinary persons start out as natural
incompatibilists… Ordinary persons have to be talked out of
this natural incompatibilism by the clever arguments of
philosophers (Kane 1999).

When ordinary people come to consciously recognize and
understand that some action is contingent upon circumstances
in an agent’s past that are beyond that agent’s control, they
quickly lose a propensity to impute moral responsibility to the
agent for that action. (Cover & O’Leary-Hawthorne 1996: 50)

Clearly, these are empirical claims, but it has traditionally been assumed that there is no
need to test them using systematic experimental techniques. After all, philosophers are
continually engaged in a kind of informal polling. They present material in classes and
listen to how their students respond. What they typically find, it seems, is that students
lean strongly toward incompatibilism, and this is customarily taken to indicate that folk
morality, as practiced outside the confines of philosophy classrooms, is itself
incompatibilist. But when researchers began examining these questions more
systematically, their findings did not confirm the claims that philosophy professors had
been making about their students. In fact, the results pointed strongly in the opposite
direction: people’s judgments, over a range of stimulus materials, appeared to be strongly
compatibilist.

The first study to arrive at this surprising conclusion was conducted by Viney and
colleagues (1982; 1988). The researchers used an initial questionnaire to distinguish
between subjects who believed that the universe was deterministic and those who did not.
All subjects were then given questions in which they were given an opportunity to
provide justifications for acts of punishment. The key finding was that determinists were

5 Jackson (1998) is a rare philosopher who makes this methodology explicit. For the difficulties Jackson
faces, see Doris and Stich (2005)
no less likely than indeterminists to offer retributivist justifications. This finding provided some initial evidence that most determinists were predominately compatibilists.

Woolfolk, Doris and Darley (2006) arrived at a similar conclusion using a very different methodology. They ran a series of experiments in which subjects were given short vignettes about agents who operated under high levels of constraint. In one such vignette, a character named Bill is captured by terrorists and given a ‘compliance drug’ to induce him to murder his friend:

Its effects are similar to the impact of expertly administered hypnosis; it results in total compliance. To test the effects of the drug, the leader of the kidnappers shouted at Bill to slap himself. To his amazement, Bill observed his own right hand administering an open-handed blow to his own left cheek, although he had no sense of having willed his hand to move. The leader then handed Bill a pistol with one bullet in it. Bill was ordered to shoot Frank in the head...Bill thought he noticed his finger moving on the trigger, but could not feel any sensations of movement. While he was observing these events, feeling like a puppet, passively observing his body moving in space, his hand closed on the pistol, discharging it and blowing Frank’s brains out.

The researchers also manipulated the degree to which the agent was portrayed as identifying with the behavior he has been ordered to perform. Subjects in one condition were told that Bill did not want to kill Frank; those in the other condition were told that Bill was happy to have the chance to kill Frank. The results showed that subjects were more inclined to hold Bill morally responsible when he identified with the behavior than when he did not. In other words, people assigned more responsibility when there were higher levels of identification even though the agent’s behavior was entirely constrained. (A manipulation check indicated that subjects, quite sensibly, recognized the strength of the ‘compliance drug’ constraint.) The study therefore provides strong evidence for the view that people are willing to hold an agent morally responsible for a behavior even when that agent could not possibly have done otherwise.

Finally, Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer and Turner (2006) ran a series of experiments in which subjects were given stories about agents who performed immoral behaviors in deterministic worlds. Subjects were then asked to say whether these agents
were morally responsible for what they had done. In one such experiment, subjects were given the following case:

Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and we build a supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and from the current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at any future time. It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25th, 2150 A.D., twenty years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information and the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 PM on January 26th, 2195. As always, the supercomputer’s prediction is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 PM on January 26th, 2195.

Subjects were then asked whether Jeremy was morally blameworthy. The vast majority (83%) said yes, indicating that they thought an agent could be morally blameworthy even if all of his behaviors were determined by natural laws. The researchers conducted three experiments – using three quite different ways of explaining determinism – and always found a similar pattern of responses.

Looking at these results, it may seem mysterious that any philosopher could have thought that ordinary people were incompatibilists. How could philosophers have concluded that people were incompatibilists when they so readily give compatibilist answers in systematic psychological studies? Are philosophy professors just completely out of touch with what their undergraduates really think? We suspect that something more complex is going on: perhaps people tend to give compatibilist answers to concrete questions about particular cases but incompatibilist answers to abstract questions about general moral principles. Then the divergence between the findings from psychological studies and the conclusions of philosophers teaching classes might simply be due to a difference between two ways of framing the relevant question.

Nichols and Knobe (2005) conducted an experiment to test this hypothesis. All subjects were given a story about a universe (‘Universe A’) in which events always unfold according to deterministic laws. Subjects in the ‘abstract condition’ were then given the question:

In Universe A, is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions?
Subjects in the ‘concrete condition’ were given the question:

In Universe A, a man named Bill has become attracted to his secretary, and he decides that the only way to be with her is to kill his wife and 3 children. He knows that it is impossible to escape from his house in the event of a fire. Before he leaves on a business trip, he sets up a device in his basement that burns down the house and kills his family.

Is Bill fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children?

The results were dramatic. A full 72% of subjects in the concrete condition said that the agent was fully morally responsible, but less than 5% of subjects in the abstract condition said that it was possible to be fully morally responsible in a deterministic universe.

If this pattern of results is replicated in further experiments, we will have good reason to believe that no invariantist theory of moral responsibility can capture all of people’s ordinary judgments. Traditional incompatibilist theories diverge from people’s judgments in more concrete cases, whereas traditional compatibilist theories diverge from people’s judgments about more abstract principles. The only kind of theory that could consistently accord with people’s judgments would be a theory that generated different conclusions depending on whether the question at hand was abstract or concrete.

Variance Due to Differences in Normative Status

As we explained above, the ambition of invariantist accounts of moral responsibility is to find a single system of criteria that can be used to assess moral responsibility for all possible behaviors. One is not supposed to end up with one criterion for morally good behaviors and another, slightly different criterion for morally bad behaviors. The aim is rather to find a single system of underlying principles from which all moral responsibility judgments can be derived.

This approach certainly has a strong intuitive appeal. It seems that moral responsibility is one thing and the goodness or badness of the behavior is something else. If we put together a judgment of moral responsibility with a judgment about whether the behavior itself is good or bad, we can determine whether or not the agent deserves praise or blame. But — it might be claimed — we do not need to assess the goodness or badness
of the behavior itself before determining whether or not the agent is responsible for performing it.

Adherents of normative competence theories, for example, have sometimes argued that it is possible to find a single set of criteria that can be applied to all behaviors, regardless of their moral status. The claim is that we can use this same set of criteria to make moral responsibility judgments for morally good behaviors, morally bad behaviors, and even behaviors that are morally neutral (e.g., Fischer & Ravizza 1998). This is a claim at the level of philosophical theory, but one will want to ask, in as much as one follows the philosophically familiar course of taking conformity to actual practice as a theoretical desideratum, how well it accords with people’s practice. Our task now is to figure out whether or not it is possible to capture people’s ordinary judgments by setting forth a single basic set of criteria that apply to all kinds of behavior.

A growing body of evidence suggests that it is not. In fact, there appear to be at least five distinct asymmetries whereby the criteria for moral responsibility depend in part on the moral status of the behavior itself.

1. The side-effect asymmetry. It is widely agreed that an agent can only be morally responsible for a behavior if she stands to that behavior in a certain kind of psychological relation. Still, there has been considerable disagreement about precisely which sort of psychological relation is necessary here. Some authors suggest that the agent only needs to have certain beliefs about what she is doing (e.g., Fischer & Ravizza 1998); others say that the agent needs to identify herself with the behavior (e.g., Franfurt 1988; Doris 2002: Ch. 7); and a number of researchers have suggested that there is an important link between moral responsibility and the notion of acting intentionally (e.g., Wallace 1994). In general, participants in this debate have tried to find a single type of psychological relation that would be necessary for moral responsibility in all cases. What we want to suggest here is that things may not be quite so simple. Perhaps different psychological relations prove relevant depending on whether the behavior itself is good or bad.

Consider people’s judgments of moral responsibility in cases of foreseen side-effects. These are cases in which an agent performs a behavior because she wants to bring about one effect (the desired effect) but is aware that she will also be bringing about some
other effect that she does not specifically desire (the foreseen side-effect). The question is whether people will feel that the agent is responsible for bringing about the foreseen side-effects of her behaviors. As you may have guessed, the answer appears to be that it depends on whether the side-effects themselves are morally good or morally bad.

One way to get at this phenomenon is to conduct studies in which subjects are randomly assigned to receive either a vignette about a morally good side-effect or a morally bad side-effect. In one such study (Knobe 2003), subjects in one condition were given a vignette about an agent who harms the environment:

The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, 'We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.'

The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’

They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.

Subjects in the other condition received a vignette that was almost exactly the same, except that the word ‘harm’ was replaced with ‘help.’ The vignette thus became:

The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also help the environment.’

The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about helping the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’

They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped.

As expected, people’s moral judgments showed a marked asymmetry. Most subjects who had been given the vignette about environmental harm said that the chairman deserved blame, but very few subjects who had been given the vignette about environmental help said that the chairman deserved praise. Subsequent research has found similar effects using other vignettes (Knobe 2003; Sverdlik 2004). There appears to be a general tendency whereby people are given blame for bad side-effects but are not given praise for good side-effects. Thus, if we wanted to know whether a given effect was the sort of thing for which an agent would be said to deserve praise or blame, it would not be
enough merely to know about the agent’s psychological relation to the effect. We would also have to know whether the effect itself was good or bad.

How is this effect to be explained? It might at first be thought that the effect here is due to a quite general ‘negativity bias’ (e.g., Rothbart and Park 1986: 137; Richey et al. 1975, 1982; Reeder and Coover 1986; Skowronski and Carlston 1989) – i.e., that people simply have a general tendency to be ‘stingier’ with praise than they are with blame. The asymmetry we see here could then be understood as just one manifestation of an across-the-board disposition to apply more stringent criteria for moral responsibility in cases where a behavior is morally good. But as we shall see, things are not so simple. There does not appear to be a general effect whereby people are always stingier with praise than with blame. Rather, it appears that there is a complex interaction between the goodness or badness of the behavior and the criteria for moral responsibility.

2. The emotion asymmetry. The complexity of people's responses emerges especially clearly when we consider the role that the attribution of emotional states plays in judgments of moral responsibility. Sometimes an agent is so overwhelmed by emotion that she cannot resist performing a particular behavior. On such ‘heated’ occasions, will people assign less praise or blame than they would have if the agent had decided to perform the behavior after a period of calm deliberation?

Pizarro, Uhlmann and Salovey (2003) set out to determine whether the impact of emotion might depend on the moral status of the behavior itself. They began by constructing a series of vignettes about agents who perform behaviors as a result of overwhelming emotion. Some of the vignettes featured morally good behaviors; others featured morally bad behaviors. Here is an example of a vignette with a morally good behavior:

Because of his overwhelming and uncontrollable sympathy,
Jack impulsively gave the homeless man his only jacket even
though it was freezing outside.

And here is one with a morally bad behavior:
Because of his overwhelming and uncontrollable anger, Jack impulsively smashed the window of the car parked in front of him because it was parked too close to his.

For each of these vignettes, the researchers then constructed a contrast case in which the agent acted calmly and deliberately. So, for example, the contrast case for the morally good behavior described above was:

Jack calmly and deliberately gave the homeless man his only jacket even though it was freezing outside.

And the contrast case for the morally bad behavior was:

Jack calmly and deliberately smashed the window of the car parked in front of him because it was parked too close to his.

When the researchers gave these vignettes to subjects, they found a striking asymmetry. Subjects gave the agent considerably less blame for morally bad behaviors when those behaviors were the result of overwhelming emotion than when they were the result of calm deliberation. But for morally good behaviors, there was no corresponding effect. Subjects assigned just as much praise when the agent acted on overwhelming emotion as when the agent acted after calm deliberation. Apparently, emotion only diminishes attributions of responsibility in cases of transgression.

Putting the side-effect asymmetry together with the emotion asymmetry, we see the beginnings of a complex pattern. It seems that the fact that an outcome was merely a foreseen side-effect reduces the responsibility attributed for morally good behaviors but not for morally bad ones, whereas the fact that a behavior was the product of overwhelming emotion reduces the responsibility attributed for morally bad behaviors but not for morally good ones.

3. The intention/action asymmetry. As if this were not complicated enough, we now turn to people’s attributions of responsibility for unfulfilled intentions. Suppose an agent forms an intention but never actually gets a chance to perform the corresponding action. Will people assign praise or blame for the mere forming of the intention? Here again, the answer appears to depend on whether the behavior in question is good or bad.
To confirm this hypothesis, Malle and Bennett (2004) constructed pairs of sentences — with each pair consisting of one sentence that described an action and one that described the corresponding intention. Some of the pairs described actions and intentions that were morally good; others described actions and intentions that were morally bad. One of the morally good pairs was:

[action] helped a neighbor fix his roof.
[intention] intends to help a neighbor fix his roof.

One of the morally bad pairs was:

[action] sold cocaine to his teenage cousin.
[intention] intends to sell cocaine to his teenage cousin.

Subjects were given a list of such sentences and asked to make moral judgments. Some subjects were given sentences about actions; others were given sentences about mere intentions. In either case, subjects were asked how much praise or blame the agent deserved. This “between subjects” design allowed the researchers to measure the difference between the amount of praise or blame given for an action and the amount given for the corresponding intention.

As expected, there was a significant asymmetry between the morally good cases and the morally bad cases. Specifically, the difference between the amount of praise for morally good actions vs. morally good intentions was far greater than the difference in blame for morally bad actions vs. morally bad intentions. (Indeed, the effect size of the difference for morally good pairs was twice as high as the effect size for morally bad pairs.) In other words, people were given almost as much blame for bad intentions as they were for bad actions, but they were not given nearly as much praise for good intentions as they were for good actions. Apparently, while good intentions may not pave the road to hell, they don’t do much to grease the rails to heaven.

4. The moral ignorance asymmetry. It is often supposed that an agent is not morally responsible for her behavior when that behavior is the product of non-culpable ignorance. Thus, consider the agent who asks a question that ends up hurting someone’s feelings. It seems that this agent is not morally responsible unless there was some way she could have guessed that she was bringing up a touchy subject.
The issue becomes considerably more complex, however, when the ignorance in question is concerned only with moral considerations. Suppose that an agent knows all of the relevant non-moral facts but suffers from a kind of ignorance that makes her unable to see that a particular action is wrong. Is she still morally responsible for her action?

Unfortunately for those who think that this question admits of an easy answer, Shoemaker (2007) has gathered data that raise some interesting and difficult new philosophical issues. First, he presented subjects with the case of a dictator named JoJo. (The case closely follows an example from Wolf 1987.)

JoJo is the favorite son of Jo the First, an evil and sadistic dictator of a small, undeveloped country, entirely cut off from the outside world. Because of his father’s special feelings for the boy, JoJo is given a special education and is allowed to accompany his father and observe his daily routine. In light of this treatment, little JoJo, who worships his father (as most boys do), takes his father as a role model and develops values just like his dad’s. As an adult, JoJo does the same sorts of things his father did, including sending people to prison or to death or to torture chambers on the basis of whim. He does these things because he sincerely believes they are morally right, and he is aware of no reason to think otherwise. One day, a peasant sneezes as JoJo walks by, so JoJo heads over to the peasant and punches him in the face, just like his father would have done. He feels no guilt afterwards.

Other subjects were presented with a case exactly like this one except that it described JoJo as having all of the relevant moral knowledge. Just as one might expect, subjects thought that JoJo was less morally blameworthy when they were told that he suffered from moral ignorance than they were when they were told that he had the relevant moral knowledge.

Now comes the surprising part. In another condition, Shoemaker presented subjects with a story in which JoJo's action is morally praiseworthy. This story began much like the first one but then ended with the words:

As he’s pulling back his fist, though, he suddenly feels compassion and discovers that he can’t bring himself to punch the peasant, even though he still believes it’s the right thing to do. He thus backs away and lets
the peasant go free, even though he believes that doing so is immoral, and he feels quite guilty afterwards.

Here again, the intuitions of subjects who received this story could be compared with intuitions of subjects who received a story that was almost exactly the same except that JoJo had all of the relevant knowledge. But this time, there was no difference in moral judgments. Subjects thought that JoJo was no less praiseworthy when he didn't know he was doing the right thing as when he did know (cf. Arpaly 2003).

In other words, there seems to be an asymmetry such that moral ignorance makes people think an agent is less blameworthy but does not make people think the agent is less praiseworthy. Will it be possible to explain this asymmetry and all of the others using a single invariant system of criteria? The prospects are looking dimmer and dimmer.

5. The severity asymmetry. Finally, consider cases in which the harm is due entirely to an accident. For any given accident, it will almost always be possible to find some way in which some agent could have taken precautions that would have prevented it, but one does not always conclude that such agents are responsible for the harm that results. Quite often, one feels that the agents did all that they could reasonably be expected to do and that they are therefore not responsible for the accidents that eventually arose. So it seems that people are able to establish a vague sort of threshold, such that one can say: ‘As long as the agent’s degree of care does not fall below this threshold, she is not responsible for the harm that results.’ The key question now is whether people always draw that threshold at the same point or whether the precise location of the threshold actually depends on the goodness or badness of the outcome that ends up occurring.

Four decades of research on this topic points unequivocally to the conclusion that the location of the threshold actually depends on the nature of the outcome itself. People are willing to say that an agent is responsible for a severe harm even when that agent’s behavior was only very slightly negligent whereas they refused to say that an agent is responsible for mild harms unless the agent was very negligent indeed.6

6 Note that this asymmetry is different in form from the four asymmetries discussed above. The asymmetry here is not between good outcomes and bad outcomes but rather between mildly bad outcomes and severely bad outcomes.

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The severity asymmetry was first detected in a classic study by Walster (1966) and has since been replicated in a broad array of additional experiments. In Walster’s original study, all subjects were given a story about a man who parks his car at the top of a hill. They were told that the man remembered to put on his brakes but that he neglected to have his brake cables checked. The car rolls down the hill and ends up creating an accident. In one condition, subjects were told that the resulting harm was mild (a damaged fender); in the other condition, subjects were told that the resulting harm was severe (serious injury to an innocent child). All subjects were then asked whether the agent had acted carelessly and whether he was responsible for the accident. There was no difference between conditions in subjects’ judgments as to whether the agent acted carelessly, but subjects were significantly more likely to say that the agent was responsible for the accident in the condition where the harm was described as severe than they were in the condition where the harm was described as mild.7

This result was regarded as surprising, since it was initially assumed that people’s responsibility judgments would depend only on the agent’s level of negligence and not on the level of harm that ended up resulting. But the effect obtained in Walster’s original study has subsequently been replicated in a number of additional studies using quite different methodologies, and a recent meta-analysis of 75 studies on the topic leaves little doubt that the effect is real (Robbennolt 2000).

**Summing Up**

Thus far, we have presented data from five studies on people’s assignment of praise and blame. These five studies all used the same basic structure. People were presented with behaviors that differed in their moral status but seemed highly similar in every other relevant respect. It was then shown that people ascribed a lot of praise or blame to one of the behaviors but not to the other. The key question now is whether these results indicate that the folk practice of responsibility attribution is not invariantist or

7 Note that this result goes beyond the phenomena usually discussed under the heading of ‘moral luck’ (Nagel 1976; Williams 1981). It is not simply that people assign more blame when the outcome is severe than they do when the outcome is mild (which would not be a very surprising experimental result); rather, the key finding is that subjects actually think that the agent is morally responsible for the severe harm but that he or she is not morally responsible for the mild harm.
whether there is some way to explain the results even on the assumption that people are applying the very same criteria in all cases.

It might be argued, for example, that the asymmetries obtained in the studies are not really showing us anything about people’s attributions of moral responsibility. Maybe people regard the agents in both conditions as morally responsible; it’s just that they don’t assign praise or blame in one of the conditions because they do not feel that the agent in that condition truly did anything good or bad. This explanation might be plausible for the intention/action asymmetry, but it does not seem plausible for any of the others on our list. Subjects can be reasonably supposed to believe that helping the environment is something good and smashing a car window is something bad. To the extent that people do not assign praise or blame for these behaviors, it is presumably because they do not take the agent to be morally responsible.

A second possible strategy would be to argue that there is a single, more or less unified criterion for moral responsibility and that all of the apparent asymmetries we have discussed can be derived in some way from this one criterion. So, for example, Wolf (1990) has argued that what we have called the ‘emotion asymmetry’ can actually be derived in a straightforward way from the normative competence theory. Recall that the normative competence theory says that an agent is morally responsible if and only if she is capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons. But this unified theory seems to lead immediately to different judgments in cases of different emotions. After all, it does seem that overwhelming and uncontrollable anger might render a person incapable of doing the right thing for the right reasons but that overwhelming and uncontrollable sympathy does not have the same effect.

Given the actual data gathered about the emotion asymmetry, it is not at all clear that this theory accords with the overall pattern of people’s intuitions. (Note that Pizarro and colleagues [2003: Study 2] found that subjects were reluctant to praise an agent who acted out of compassion but who wished that he could become less compassionate.) But that is not the real problem. The real problem is that the theory does not even begin to explain the various other asymmetries (e.g., the side-effect asymmetry). To show that the folk practice is invariantist in the relevant sense, it would be necessary to find a single system of criteria that can explain all of the asymmetries described in this section.
It certainly would be an instructive and valuable effort to look for a single invariant system of criteria from which all of these apparent asymmetries can be derived, and we wish future researchers the best of luck in this effort. But to be frank, we don't think it is very likely that they will have much success.

Variance in the Antecedents of Responsibility Judgments

At this point, it might be thought that we have located some variantist elements in certain peripheral aspects of the practice of responsibility attribution but that there still remains a kind of ‘core’ of the practice that is entirely invariantist. Hence, someone might say: ‘Look, you’ve convinced me that at least some aspects of the criteria vary, but let’s not get carried away. It certainly does seem that many central aspects of the criteria always remain exactly the same. No matter whether the outcome is good or bad, we will always be concerned with questions about whether the agent caused that outcome and whether she brought it about intentionally. These aspects of the criteria, at least, appear to be perfectly invariant.’

Our response to this objection will be a somewhat surprising one. It is at least possible that people always base responsibility judgments on antecedent judgments about causation and intentional action, but we want to suggest that these antecedent judgments themselves are not invariant. It may be, e.g., that people always ask themselves whether the agent caused the outcome and whether the agent acted intentionally, but there is evidence to suggest that people do not have invariant criteria for assigning causation and intentional action. Instead, it appears that people use different criteria depending on whether the behavior itself is good or bad.

Consider first the claim that responsibility judgments are always sensitive to judgments as to whether or not the agent acted intentionally. How can this claim be reconciled with the hypothesis (presented above) that the relevant psychological relation depends on whether the behavior itself is good or bad? The answer is simple. People always ask whether the agent acted intentionally, but their judgments as to whether or not the agent acted intentionally sometimes depend on whether the behavior itself was good or bad.
This point comes out clearly in the experiment described above (Knobe 2003). Recall that all subjects were given a vignette about an agent who brings about a foreseen side-effect, but some subjects received a vignette in which the side-effect was morally bad and others received a vignette in which the side-effect was morally good. The surprising result was that subjects in these different conditions had different intuitions about whether or not the agent acted intentionally. Most subjects in the harm condition said that the corporate executive intentionally harmed the environment, but most subjects in the help condition said that the agent unintentionally helped the environment. Here we find an asymmetry in people’s views about whether the agent acted intentionally even though all of the relevant psychological features appear to be the same in the two conditions. The chief difference seems to lie in the moral status of the behavior performed.

These results are puzzling, and a number of competing hypotheses have been proposed to explain them (Adams & Steadman 2003, 2004; Knobe 2004; Machery forthcoming; Malle 2006; Nadelhoffer 2006; Nichols & Ulatowski forthcoming). We will not be defending a specific hypothesis here. Instead, we simply want to point to the surprising mesh between the criteria used for assessing moral responsibility and the criteria used for determining whether or not an agent acted intentionally. We noted above that moral responsibility judgments rely on different psychological states depending on whether the behavior itself is good or bad. In particular, it seems that foresight is often sufficient when the behavior is morally bad but that actually aiming at the relevant effect is usually necessary when the behavior is morally good. We now see exactly the same pattern in people’s judgments as to whether the agent acted intentionally. Here again, it seems that foresight is sufficient when the behavior is morally bad but that actually aiming at the effect is necessary when the behavior is morally good.

Similar remarks apply to people’s judgments of causation. It may well be that judgments of causation play an important role whenever people are trying to assess moral

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8 This effect appears to be remarkably robust. It continues to emerge when the vignettes are translated into Hindi and run on Hindi-speaking subjects (Knobe & Burra 2006), when subjects are only four years old (Leslie et al. forthcoming), and even when subjects have deficits in emotional processing due to frontal lobe damage (Young et al. 2006). For further replications and extensions, see Adams & Steadman (2005), Feltz and Cokely (2007), Nadelhoffer (2006), Malle (2006), McCann (2005), and Nichols and Ulatowski (forthcoming).
responsibility, but the evidence suggests that causal judgments themselves are not derived using invariant criteria. Instead, it appears that the criteria used in causal judgments vary depending on the moral status of the behavior itself.

This point comes out especially clearly in a well-known study by Alicke and colleagues (1992). All subjects were given a story about an agent who is driving home 10 miles per hour above the speed limit. In one condition, the agent needs to get home swiftly so that he can hide the present he just bought for his parents. In the other, he needs to get home so that he can hide his stash of cocaine. Either way, he then ends up getting into an accident. The key dependent variable was subjects’ judgments about the degree to which the agent caused the accident by driving too fast. By now, you have probably guessed the result. Subjects were significantly more inclined to say that the agent caused the accident when he was driving home to hide his cocaine than when he was driving home to hide the present (Alicke 1992). Similar results have been obtained in a variety of other studies (Alicke 2000; Alicke et al. 1994; Solan and Darley 2001). The consensus among social psychologists appears to be that, collectively, these studies provide strong evidence for the view that moral considerations have a powerful impact on people’s causal judgments.

Nonetheless, most social psychologists assume that moral considerations do not actually play any role in people’s underlying concept of causation. Instead, the usual view distinguishes between multiple levels. First, there is the competence that people use to assess causation. This competence is taken to be a purely descriptive mechanism (perhaps something along the lines suggested by Kelly’s, 1967, theory of ‘the person as scientist’), and it is assumed that moral considerations play no role in it. Then, second, there is some additional process by which moral considerations can ‘bias’ or ‘distort’ people’s causal judgments, leading them away from what the underlying competence itself would have proposed.

In recent years, however, a number of philosophers have proposed more radical views according to which the observed effects of moral considerations are showing us something fundamental about the concept of causation itself (Dray 1957; Hitchcock 2005; Knobe & Fraser forthcoming; Mackie 1955; McGrath 2005; Thomson 2003). These philosophers argue that the connection between moral judgments and causal
judgments is not, in fact, due to a performance error. Rather, people’s moral judgments influence their causal judgments because moral features actually figure in people’s concept of causation.

Perhaps the best way to get a sense for what these philosophers are suggesting is to consider the kinds of cases they typically discuss. Here is one representative case:

The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked with pens. The administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens, but faculty members are supposed to buy their own.

The administrative assistants typically do take the pens. Unfortunately, so do the faculty members. The receptionist has repeatedly emailed them reminders that only administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens.

On Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants encounters Professor Smith walking past the receptionist’s desk. Both take pens. Later that day, the receptionist needs to take an important message… but she has a problem. There are no pens left on her desk.

Faced with this case, most subjects say that Professor Smith did cause the problem but that the administrative assistant did not cause the problem (Knobe & Fraser forthcoming).

And yet, the two agents seem to have performed almost exactly the same behavior in almost exactly the same circumstances; the principal difference between the two behaviors appears to lie in their differing moral statuses. In cases like these, it seems plausible to suppose that moral considerations could really be playing some fundamental role in the basic competence by which we assess causation.

Of course, it might be true that causal judgments always have the same impact on judgments of moral responsibility, regardless of whether the behavior itself is morally good or morally bad. But the moral goodness or badness of the behavior still ends up influencing moral responsibility judgments in an indirect way. It influences people’s causal judgments, which in turn play a role in their judgments of moral responsibility.

**Variance Due to Relationships**

Philosophical discussions of moral responsibility are often concerned in an essential way with our ordinary practice of responsibility attribution, and philosophers therefore frequently appeal to ordinary people’s judgments about particular cases. But the cases described in these philosophical discussions almost always take a somewhat unusual
form. They are almost always hypothetical cases involving entirely *imaginary* characters. So, for example, Frankfurt’s (1969) famous argument about alternate possibilities relies on a story about a man named Jones being controlled by a nefarious neurosurgeon named Black. When one sees that most people agree about whether or not the characters in these stories are morally responsible, it is easy to get the sense that there must be some invariant criterion for moral responsibility that almost everyone is using.

But, clearly, ordinary attributions of moral responsibility do not usually work like these philosophical examples. Most ordinary attributions of responsibility are not about complete strangers; they are about people to whom we stand in certain *relationships* (friends, spouses, coworkers, etc.). If we want to know whether there really is an invariant criterion for responsibility judgments, we need to look at cases involving a wide variety of relationships and see whether it is possible to identify a single criterion underlying them all.

The best way to address this question is to look at the psychological literature on moral responsibility. Unfortunately, though, most of this literature uses the very same methodology that the philosophical literature does. Indeed, a recent review (Pearce 2003) found that 77% of psychological studies on blame used hypothetical scenarios, and 65% used scenarios in which the transgressor was an entirely fictional character. So although the empirical literature does provide a few fascinating insights into the connection between personal relationships and attributions of moral responsibility, it also leaves a number of important questions unanswered. Here we discuss a few highlights of the existing literature and then pose a number of questions that still remain unaddressed.

We begin with Arriaga and Rusbult’s (1998) study of perspective taking and blame. The phrase ‘perspective taking’ refers here to a disposition to try to imagine how a situation might appear from another person’s position. The researchers wanted to know whether this disposition would be associated with low levels of blame attribution. So they proceeded in the obvious way. They gave all subjects a questionnaire designed to assess an overall disposition for perspective taking. Then they presented subjects with hypothetical stories and asked them how much blame the agents in these stories deserved. The key research question was whether or not there would be a correlation between level of perspective taking and level of blame. As it happened, there was no significant
correlation: high levels of perspective taking were not positively associated with low levels of blame attribution.

But the researchers also introduced an interesting variation on the usual experimental paradigm. Subjects were asked questions designed to assess the degree to which they showed perspective taking specifically in relation to their spouses. Instead of being asked general questions about their personalities, subjects were asked to specify their level of agreement with sentences about how they normally thought of their partner (e.g., ‘When I’m upset or irritated by my partner, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in his/her shoes.’). After answering these initial questions, each subject was presented with a hypothetical scenario concerning his or her spouse. For example:

You feel neglected by your partner, who has been very busy lately. You nevertheless make dinner plans for an approaching evening, to which the partner reluctantly agrees. Your partner arrives for dinner half an hour late, not ready to dine, explaining that he or she must cancel dinner because of a course project that is due the next day.

Subjects were then asked how much blame the spouse would deserve if this scenario had actually taken place. As predicted, there was a significant correlation whereby subjects who were high in perspective taking in relation to their spouses tended to assign lower levels of blame. In other words, people’s attributions of blame to an agent seemed to depend on their relationship to that particular agent, with people assigning lower amounts of blame to those agents whose perspectives they were especially likely to take.

Similar results were obtained in a study by Fincham, Beach and Baucom (1987). The aim of the study was to compare blame attributions among ordinary couples with attributions from ‘distressed’ couples who had chosen to come in for counseling. Members of each of these groups received two kinds of questions:

(1) They were told to imagine that their spouses had performed particular behaviors and then asked how much praise or blame the spouses would deserve.

(2) They were told to imagine that they themselves had performed certain behaviors and were asked how much praise or blame they themselves would deserve.
The key question was whether subjects in each group would assign different levels of blame depending on whether the agent was the self or the spouse.

Members of distressed couples showed an asymmetry between judgments about the self and judgments about the spouse. They assigned more credit to themselves than to their spouses and more blame to their spouses than to themselves. This result is hardly surprising. The surprising results came from the normal couples (couples who had not specifically come in for counseling). Members of these couples also showed an asymmetry — but in the opposite direction. They assigned more credit to their spouses than they did to themselves. In other words, members of normal couples were in a state of systematic disagreement with each other. Each of them thought that the other was the one who deserved more praise.

Of course, a number of questions arise about how to interpret these results. It is possible (at least in principle) that the results could be obtained even if people’s relationships had no effect at all on their attributions of blame and praise. For example, it could be that some factor that has nothing to do with people’s relationships is causing certain couples to show higher levels of blame. This high blame might then cause the relationship to become distressed, thereby producing the correlation found in the study. But the experimental evidence suggests that the process does not actually work like this (e.g., Harvey et al. 1978). Instead, it appears that attributions and marital satisfaction affect each other in a cyclical fashion, with high levels of satisfaction leading to low levels of blame and low levels of satisfaction leading to high levels of blame.

Still, a question arises about precisely how marital satisfaction impacts attributions of blame. In particular, one wants to know whether marital satisfaction is actually having any impact on the fundamental criteria underlying people’s moral judgments or whether it only affects moral judgments indirectly by first affecting people’s judgments regarding particular matters of fact (what their spouses are trying to do, how much control they have over certain outcomes, etc.).

The studies of Madden and Janoff-Bulman (1981) help us to address this question. Women exhibiting varying levels of marital satisfaction were presented with hypothetical stories involving their spouses. They were then asked to make judgments about both (a) certain purely factual aspects of the stories (e.g., how much control the
spouse would have had over particular outcomes) and (b) the amount of blame the spouse would deserve if the fictitious events had actually happened.

As in earlier studies, there was a correlation whereby people with lower levels of marital satisfaction showed higher levels of blame. In this study, however, it was also possible to get a handle on the specific mechanisms whereby marital satisfaction and blame were related. In particular, it was possible to test the hypothesis that marital satisfaction only influenced blame attributions indirectly – i.e., that marital satisfaction influenced judgments about specific matters of fact, which then influenced attributions of blame. The results indicated that this is not, in fact, how the effect arises. It seems that the relationship between marital satisfaction and blame is entirely direct, unmediated by specific factual judgments.

We began this section by noting that philosophical discussions of moral responsibility often try to make contact with our ordinary practice of responsibility attribution. The most common method for investigating this practice is to look at people’s judgments concerning particular cases. However, the studies we have presented seem to indicate that people’s judgments about particular cases can vary dramatically depending on their relationship to the agent. Thus, people may arrive at different attributions depending on whether the agent is a beloved partner, a bitter enemy, or a complete stranger. This conclusion sheds new light on the methods usually used in philosophical discussions. It seems that these discussions have been concerned with attributions to one particular type of agent — namely, attributions to agents with whom one has no prior relationship.

Here it might be argued that the absence of any prior relationship gives us an especially pure glimpse into the nature of responsibility attributions. It might be thought, e.g., that people’s relationships to the agent serve as a kind of ‘distortion,’ leading them to violate norms that they themselves accept. This is an interesting hypothesis, which needs to be investigated empirically. One wants to know whether information about personal relationships actually figures in the fundamental competence underlying ascriptions of moral responsibility or whether it only impacts the process by increasing the probability of various performance errors.
On a related note, it would be helpful to know how people who stand in different relationships to the agent conceive of the difference between their perspectives. Take the case of a woman who cheats on her husband. Here we might find that her husband regards her as blameworthy but her friends do not. What remains to be seen is how people make sense of the divergence of attitudes in cases like this one. One possibility would be that both sides agree that there is a single objective answer to the question as to whether the woman is blameworthy or not and that they simply disagree about what this answer actually is. Another possibility would be that neither side believes that there is any real disagreement. That is, both sides might feel that different standards are appropriate depending on one’s relationship to the woman in question, and everyone might therefore agree that she is worthy of being blamed by her husband but not by her friends. If we did obtain this result, we would have evidence that people explicitly reject the idea of invariant criteria for the ascription of moral responsibility.

Conclusion

Thus far, we have been marshalling evidence for the claim that the ordinary practice of responsibility attribution is pervasively variantist. People’s ordinary responsibility judgments do not appear to follow from a single system of criteria that can be applied in all cases. Instead, it seems that people use different sorts of criteria depending on the case at hand.

In this final section, we assume that the evidence presented above is sufficient to warrant this basic claim and then go on to examine its implications for psychology and for moral philosophy. One of our key claims will be that these two sorts of implications should be understood as separate. The correct psychological theory cannot by itself settle the relevant moral questions, nor can the correct moral theory tell us what we need to know about the psychological questions.
From a psychological perspective, the most important remaining questions are about how to explain the various results we have been reviewing here. Clearly, the only way to answer these questions would be to go through each of the different effects and consider in detail the various hypotheses one might offer to explain it. Here, however, our aim is not so much to pursue this project in detail as to make some general comments about how such a research program might proceed.

To begin with, it is customary to distinguish between two different aspects of the psychological mechanism underlying people’s moral judgments:

- The *competence* underlying a person’s judgments of moral responsibility consists of that person’s own representation of the criteria for moral responsibility.
- A person’s *performance systems* are the systems that enable that person to figure out whether a given agent fulfills the criteria given by his or her underlying competence.

Note that the notion of competence employed here is a straightforwardly psychological one. The suggestion is that we posit a ‘competence’ as part of an empirical theory that, taken as a whole, enables us to predict and explain certain observable phenomena. The decision to posit a competence as part of such a theory should be regarded as independent of the various philosophical debates surrounding concepts, conceptual analysis, analyticity, and so forth.

Instead, the point is simply that it can prove helpful to distinguish between different sorts of psychological factors that play a role in generating moral judgments. Thus, suppose that people observe an agent performing a behavior and want to know whether or not this agent is responsible. They might have certain criteria about the conditions this agent needs to meet before he or she can be considered morally responsible (the underlying competence) and then certain capacities that allow them to apply those criteria to the case at hand (performance systems). Together, these two factors could generate a judgment as to whether or not the agent actually is morally responsible.

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9 We are grateful to Ron Mallon for extremely helpful comments on the material presented here.
Corresponding to these two aspects of our psychology are two possible hypotheses about why any given factor might impact people’s intuitions. One possible hypothesis would be that our competence actually represents this factor as being relevant to moral responsibility; the other would be that the factor simply interferes with the performance systems that would normally enable people to apply their competence correctly. Each of these hypotheses offers a plausible account of the various asymmetries we have been documenting here. Thus, consider the impact that relationships appear to have on attributions of responsibility. One way to explain this impact would be to say that relationships actually play a role in our underlying criteria for moral responsibility judgments; the other would be to say that the feelings we have as a result of these relationships are simply interfering with our ability to correctly apply our own criteria.

One of the most exciting developments in the study of these phenomena over the past few years has been the construction of detailed models that say precisely how the competence and performance systems together generate the patterns we have been discussing (e.g., Alicke 2006; Malle 2006; Nadelhoffer 2006; Nahmias 2006). These models bring up a variety of fascinating theoretical questions, and we cannot possibly do justice to them here. Instead, we simply want to say something about their epistemic status. Specifically, we want to emphasize that the claim that these effects are due to performance errors is an empirical claim. The best way to assess such a claim is to use the existing models to generate specific predictions and then put these predictions to the test in further experiments. If the predictions do not pan out, we will have good reason to reject the claims about performance errors.

This basic approach should be contrasted with an alternative which might initially seem appealing but which, we believe, ultimately serves only to hinder the progress of research in this area. On this alternative approach, one appeals directly to people’s intuitions about which considerations can plausibly be considered relevant to the underlying competence. For example, one might say: ‘It’s just obvious that moral judgments can’t be playing a role in the fundamental competence underlying the concept of causation.’ Or perhaps: ‘The severity of a harm couldn’t possibly be playing any role in the competence underlying judgments of moral responsibility.’ Tempting though this approach may be, we think that it does not truly have any place in a legitimate scientific
study of these phenomena. The fact that a particular view strikes certain people as obvious does not show us anything about the nature of the competence underlying ordinary attributions of responsibility. What would show us something about that competence is a specific, testable model that accounts for the existing data and can then be used to generate new predictions that can be examined in further studies.

Above all, it is important not to confuse the distinction between competence and performance (a psychological distinction) with the distinction between getting the right answer and getting the wrong answer (a normative distinction). When researchers say that a given intuition is not due to any performance error, all they mean is that this intuition was generated by correctly working out the implications of people’s own criteria. The question as to whether those criteria themselves are correct is a quite separate question, which can only be resolved by doing serious moral philosophy.

*Moral implications*

Suppose now that the basic competence underlying people’s attributions of responsibility actually does turn out to be variantist. We will then face a new question, namely: *But are they right?* That is, if we learn that people are variantists, we will have to answer the question as to whether variantism is truly correct or whether people are making some kind of mistake.

In discussions of questions like this one, it is often helpful to distinguish two basic viewpoints. *Conservatives* believe that the criteria we employ are more or less correct as they are, while *revisionists* believe that the criteria we now employ are seriously mistaken and therefore in need of revision. (For further discussion, see Vargas 2005.) Of course, most plausible views will lie somewhere on the continuum between extreme conservativism and extreme revisionism. On one hand, it seems unlikely that everything about our existing practices is perfectly fine just the way it is; on the other, it seems unlikely that everything about these practices is fundamentally flawed and in need of revision. Presumably, we will find that some aspects of our practices are now correct while others need to be revised.

The key question for present purposes, however, is not about the extent to which we should revise our practices in general but rather about whether we should specifically
revise these practices in such a way that they become invariantist. In other words, the question is whether we should remove all of the variantist elements from these practices, so that we end up applying precisely the same criteria in all cases. This question brings up a number of complex issues, and we have discussed it in detail elsewhere (Doris et al. forthcoming). Our aim here is just to make a few quick remarks about how the issue ought to be understood.

It has sometimes been suggested to us that invariantism is obviously correct and that any trace of variantism just has to involve some sort of moral error. This conclusion, we believe, is a bit too hasty. Although invariantism may ultimately turn out to be correct, its correctness is far from obvious. To see the complexity here, it may be helpful to look at the sorts of value judgments we make in other domains. Thus, consider the enormous variety of cases in which we might say that an outcome is ‘good’ – cases in which the outcome is morally good, cases in which it is aesthetically good, and so forth. Here it certainly seems plausible to suggest that we do not need to find a single fundamental system of criteria from which these two different types of judgments can be derived. One might simply say: ‘Moral judgments and aesthetic judgments are very different sorts of things. There is no reason why there has to be a single system of criteria for both.’ And, of course, a similar suggestion might be made about the relationship between moral blame and moral praise. Suppose that someone said: ‘Moral blame and moral praise are just two very different things. There is no reason why we need a single system of criteria for both.’ It should be clear that this view is a coherent one; the only question now is whether it is actually correct.

In our view, that latter question still remains open. At any rate, one cannot help but be struck by how difficult it has been to develop an invariantist theory that does not fall prey to counterexamples. Perhaps it is time to give variantism a try.

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